Finally, It’s Over: The 2016 Election and Its Aftermath

– My name is Ron Shaiko. I’m the associate director of the center and it’s my privilege to moderate
this panel this afternoon. Finally, It’s Over: The 2016
Election and Its Aftermath. I’m joined today by two of my colleagues in the government department,
Professors Brendan Nyhan and Professor Dean Lacy. You’ll notice that on
the posters there were five persons supposed to be
here and we’re missing two. Invitations went out
to both the leaderships of the Democratic and Republican Parties of New Hampshire in September, a series of backs and
forths, and basically, radio silence over the last several days and so, there’ll be
three of us here today. Hopefully, we’ll cover the
turf as much as possible. The way we’re gonna do things is that we’re gonna start off with Brendan talking about the presidential election and then, move on to Dean talking about the congressional elections, and I’ll come back with
a little bit on the state level elections
and what happened there. Obviously, we’re not
gonna get to everything. But hopefully, we’ll be succinct and concise about what we do have to say to leave plenty of questions for everyone because I think that’s gonna be the most interesting part of
the conversation, here. Not that we will be uninteresting, but I think hearing from you and what your concerns and issues are, and perhaps, us lending
a hand in wrestling with those questions will be
the best way of doing it. So, we’ll start with Brendan. – All right, thanks. Make sure. Do my Trump-esque fiddling
with the microphone. (laughing) All right, well, thanks,
it’s great to be here. Thanks everyone, for coming out. What I want to do in the time I have is to give you a political science based analysis of the election. There’s of course, a lot to say but I’m gonna try to distill it to what I think are some of
the most important points, focusing specifically on
the presidential election. And again, we’re gonna
be focusing largely on what happened in the election itself, but I’ll talk a little bit at the end about the potential
consequences and aftermath, which of course, is
something a lot of people have been thinking about
in the last couple of days. What I’m gonna do today is
talk to you about the results, what actually happened, the polls, what we saw before the election and the extent to which it was wrong, which is something people
have been talking about a lot, of course. Third, whether this corresponds to what we think we know
about how elections work, and finally, whether I can get this on the full screen, there we go. Most importantly, what
changed in this election and what it means, what the consequences might be for American
politics going forward. Okay so, this is the familiar red state/blue state map you’ve all seen, on the Washington Post website, as of a couple of hours
ago, showing Donald Trump with an electoral college majority. A few states still unofficially undecided, but over the 270 threshold necessary to, 269 electoral college vote threshold necessary to win the presidency. But, as you can see, Hillary Clinton narrowly leads in the popular vote. She’s expected to increase
that lead as the final tallies are put together
over the coming weeks. This will be six of the past
seven presidential elections the Democrats have won the popular vote, but only four of the seven have they won the electoral college vote. So, of course the red state/blue
state map doesn’t fully, it overrepresents the
portions of the country that are sparsely populated so, a more appropriate map would
be something like this, that accounts for population density. This is from the Wall Street Journal. Gives you a better sense of how the vote was actually distributed and the places in which
Hillary Clinton did well, as compared to the places
where Donald Trump did well. In terms of who voted for the candidates, as in previous elections,
the Democratic candidate of course, performed best
with non-white voters. We see her doing well with
college-educated white voters, we’ll talk about, and
increasingly less well with voters who don’t have a college degree. And again, there’s a
gender gap there among both of those educational
groups, that you’ll see. We’ll talk more about this in a moment. So, why was this election such a surprise to folks on Tuesday night? Well, the forecasting
models were largely saying that Hillary Clinton was likely to win. So, this is a summary from the upshot where I’m a contributor
at the New York Times of a series of poll based
models, as well as the one that’s labeled PW there,
which is PredictWise, which aggregates betting
and futures markets. So, you can see that the range of estimated probabilities
of a Clinton win is from 71% to greater than 99%. So, it was thought to be quite likely, but the important thing to remember is that a 70% probability
or an 85% probability is not a 100% probability and things that happen with low probability, of course, happen all the time, right? We just observed one election. So, I like this example as a story of what might be wrong with
thinking this was a certainty, rather than a probability, right? So, if you’re rolling a dice, right, and you say there’s an 83% chance you’ll roll greater than
one and you roll a six and the pundits go, “This is great!” And then you roll a four and
they say, “Look, it works!” And then you roll a one and
they say, “Data is dead,” right? So, we’ve had a lot of that
over the last couple of days and it’s important to be humble about what we don’t understand
and what we got wrong, but at the same time,
to recognize that these, a probabilistic forecast
is not a certainty. Those estimates were not
falsified by a single outcome. In fact, the national polls
were not far off, right? So, historically, they’re around the average level of error
in the estimate of the popular vote share received
by the two candidates. So, you can see the provisional
estimate there, for 2016, is right around where we were in 2012. The polls were not wildly
off at the national level. And it’s important to think
about the counterfactual, here. So, think about the
contingency in this outcome. You saw how close that election was if you looked at the state level
results for the states that determined the electoral college. Some of those margins were razor thin. We could reallocate about 100,000 votes and flip the electoral college map. So, this is Nate Silver
saying if just one out of every 100 voters shifted
from Trump to Clinton, that would have produced a net shift of two percentage points to Clinton, she would’ve won the
popular vote at the margin that was expected, the national, the state level polls would’ve
almost all been accurate with that two percentage point shift and no one today would be
saying, “Polls are broken.” So, just one in 100 voters
switching their vote would’ve been enough to
match what was expected so, it was not what was expected, but it was not completely different. The panic and chaos that
people think is happening about polls right now is overstated. Now, the polls clearly
weren’t right either, so, it’s important to think about well, why did they not
anticipate the expected outcome? And you can see here,
that the polling error, which is what’s on the Y-axis, here, was much greater in the states
that Romney won in 2012. But, this wasn’t an across
the board miss towards where Clinton’s vote share
was overstated in every state. In fact, you can see she
overperformed the polls in some Democratic leaning states. It was those states that favored Romney where Trump significantly
overperformed, okay? Specifically though, even better, the facts of this seems
even more important in understanding where
the polls went wrong is the states that had a higher proportion of non-college whites and that was the group
that Trump has focused on and been more successful with than prior Republican candidates. So you can see here, that the polling error was greatest in the states that had a higher percentage
of non-college whites. But again, this doesn’t mean that everything we
thought we know was wrong. This election maps quite
closely to what we saw in 2012, so this is simply how well Romney did in the states versus how well Trump did, according to the preliminary vote counts. And you can see, they’re
very closely linked. This map has not been scrambled. If this had fundamentally changed how American politics would work, we wouldn’t see those
being linked so closely. So, this is very consistent
with what we saw in 2012. We’re talking about
relatively small shifts but of course, all it takes, 2012 was a quite close
election as well, right? All it takes are some small shifts to flip the outcome
and that’s what we saw. Similarly, the things that we think predict presidential election outcomes also predicted this one. So, political scientists, if any of you have taken classes here with
myself or my colleagues, in American politics, we talk
a lot about the fundamentals, the things that are not
specific to the candidates that shape presidential election outcomes. And two of the most important are the state of the economy heading towards, in an election year heading, usually the second quarter is the best predictor, and second, presidential approval, okay? And you can see here, that
2016 fits quite closely with our pass historical experience, in terms of the correspondence between how popular the president is and the expected vote share. So, that dotted line represents what we would expect, given the data, and you can see that the
2016 data point there, in both cases, is very close
to what we would’ve expected. So again, no signs that everything we thought we know is wrong, here. There are, of course, things that change and we’ll talk about those in a moment. One final point, interestingly, because those factors
that I just showed you worked so well in explaining the vote, the fundamentals based models that took no account of the polls, or except for one, presidential approval, actually performed better than these more elaborate polling models that were using polls all
the way up to the end. So, if you actually took the political science forecasting models that were published several
months before the elections and you averaged them together, you actually came quite close, much closer than these more elaborate poll-averaging estimates
that you see here. So, what changed? So, the first thing I just want to say is all statements that you will hear and you have heard of the form, “Trump won because X,” are wrong. There is no one X. It’s not Facebook, it’s not
just race, it’s not just sex. There’s a whole series of things. We’re saying, “It’s just this one thing.” It’s not, okay? And similarly, in terms of voters’ reasons for casting a vote, voters don’t all have
the same motivations. The story is more complex. I’m gonna give you some suggestions about what might have changed but I would just encourage you to be skeptical about those sorts of claims. So, what changed versus 2012? Well, we see that Donald
Trump overperformed among whites without a college degree. So, you can see that here in this shift among
people who don’t have a college degree at the top level, but especially in the second group that disaggregates by education and race, a 14 point swing towards Trump in terms of performance among whites without a college degree,
relative to Mitt Romney. Now, you can see there, just above that, that Hillary Clinton did 10 points better among whites with a college degree but, if you actually look at the distribution of the US population, including the voting population, you’ll see that whites
without a college degree are the largest group in the population. So, if you’re trading off 14 points among whites without a college
degree for 10 points with, among whites with a college
degree, you’re going to lose. So, that turned out to be quite
devastating to her chances. You can also see that in
terms of income distribution because in this country,
education has become increasingly linked to income levels, increases in the Republican vote share among folks who have lower
levels of income under $50,000, increases in Democratic performance among higher income households. Here’s a bit of a broader
historical perspective on that education divide
I was just showing you. It’s important to point
out that this is unusual. You can see here in the right, there’s the overall vote distribution among folks who have a college degree versus not in the left panel, and in the right panel,
it’s just white voters, and you can see that big
gap opening up between college educated and
non-college educated whites. Now, this is Pew data
just showing this vast gap that wasn’t nearly as large under Romney. This is something new and unusual. So, where did this happen? It was concentrated in the upper Midwest, which you probably noticed in terms of when people start freaking out on TV, as those rust belt states vote
returns started to come in. So, the red here in
the map is highlighting those counties that
shifted most significantly towards Republicans versus 2012 and you can see how heavily concentrated they are in the upper Midwest. County level data
similarly, consistent with what I showed you earlier, those
improvements among counties that had a higher percentage of whites without a college degree. That’s where Trump really overperformed. One final perspective, and
I think this is important when people are saying, talking about this election in terms of race. This map here on the left, I just want to walk you through it because I think it’s very interesting. This is the change in the vote. In red, again, is highlighting
a shift towards Republicans. This is a shift from 2004 to 2012 among overwhelmingly white counties. This is a graph made by Nate Cohn and you can see here
that there was a swath that fall at kind of
the Appalachian region that swung Republican under Obama that was interpreted as a kind of racial backlash against Obama, but that was not observed
elsewhere in the country. You can see that dark red is quite unusual in terms of where Obama lost votes. But, if you actually look
at 2012 to 2016 here, again, we’re only looking at
overwhelmingly white counties, you can see that same
swath of the upper Midwest where that strong Republican shift seems to have happened in red. So, what does this mean? Let me just give you some
provisional thoughts. Again, this just happened. So, you’re seeing social
science on the fly. “We don’t know yet,” is the short answer but I’ll give you some
thoughts you might think about. These are things that
I’ve been thinking about. The most important
question coming out of this election to me, as a scholar
of American politics, is how Donald Trump
changes the party system, because the party system, partisanship, and parties organize American politics. And we have a party system that is organized along a liberal versus conservative divide, right, as you know, but, what was unusual about Trump is the extent to which he emphasized instead, this cosmopolitanism
versus nationalism divide, which often coated along
racial-ethnic lines, as well. One story that people
will be investigating coming out of this election is whether that cultural and nationalism divide is what drove the areas
we saw towards Trump, if it became a kind of identity politics type story in those areas to support him, a kind of backlash against
cosmopolitanism, more broadly. Now, we don’t know that yet
but that’s one conjecture and that’s, it’s consistent with the story that Trump’s campaign was quite unusual. He was not a normal Republican candidate. He was not a normal conservative. He ran a different kind of race and the difference in support he received is consistent, I think, with
that story, provisionally. Now, the big question is whether the rest of the political system
follows along or not. Do Republicans pivot Trump back towards traditional conservatism or do they swing towards
that cosmopolitanism versus nationalism style
of politics instead? And similarly, do the Democrats try to win back those white voters that they lost or do they essentially turn into the skid and emphasize cosmopolitanism even harder? Focus on mobilizing non-white voters and college educated
voters and give up on the white working class, which
some people are advocating. That would accelerate this, the pivot of our politics toward that divide. So, I’m just gonna close
with one last point, here, which is, all of this is great, polling is really interesting, but what really matters is governments, and what really affects people’s lives, the reason politics matters is because it affects people’s lives and we have no idea what this
will mean for the country. So, just to give you an
example of how little we know, this is the Milwaukee County Sheriff, who has been floated as a potential Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, arguing that he was about to go protest if Trump lost in the left panel, and then, in the right
panel immediately after the election saying that we should quell the protests against Trump, which would be funny if it weren’t scary if this wasn’t somewhat the person in charge of Homeland Security. He’s literally holding up
the Constitution in the picture he posted saying
we should quell protests. The Constitution, the document that protects people’s right
to engage in protest. But on the other hand, Jamie
Dimon has been floated, the head of Goldman Sachs has been floated as a potential Treasury Secretary, coming from a candidate who railed against Wall Street financiers. So, we really have not idea what sort of administration this will be and that’s ultimately the most important question coming out of this election. So, let me turn it over to Dean. (audience applauding) – There you go. – Thank you, Ron. So, these are the people who still haven’t gotten enough of this election. (audience laughs) Thank you for coming. Thank you for caring about it. I’m gonna approach my remarks like I would a presidential debate, which is I’m not gonna talk about what I was supposed to talk about. (laughing) I mean, who wants to, who’s
here to talk about Congress? I’ll say a little bit
about it and so, Congress. There, I said the first thing about it. (laughing) This is the fourth time in US history that the winner of the popular vote did not win the electoral college. I’ve lived through two of them. The other two, well, were 1876 and 1888. So, remember those years, 1876 and 1888. We call those, the years,
part of the Gilded Age. The other two years were 2000 and 2016. Now, I am often wrong but let me highlight a couple times when I was right. In 2000 I predicted that Bush would win the electoral college
but lose the popular vote and I also predicted after that that we’d abolish the electoral college. (laughing) I have a few students from my class here and I predicted about a month ago that this would be a very close election when it didn’t look like that it would be and I said I could very
well see the possibility of Trump winning the electoral college and of Clinton winning the popular vote. So, those of you who are here, shake your heads I said that, right? (laughing) It’s extra credit. (laughing) Now, I want to talk a little
bit about why that is later, but I want to put this
in historical context. Here you have a slide that I’ve been, a project that I’ve been
working on with a thesis student from two years ago
named Zachary Markovich. So, we’ve had this paper
and a couple of others out under review at academic journals, a very interesting project, I think. This shows you going back to 1832, the proportion of US states that switched their vote in the
presidential election from the prior presidential
election, all right? And since we have a different
number of states now than we did back in the
1830s, we have to count this not as a number of states that switched, but as a proportion of
states that switched. And you see the years there, so look in 1932 and 1968,
almost three quarters of the states switched how they voted from the previous election. The blue line you see is the best fit line and I won’t describe, basically, it’s a non-linear regression
that you plot through here to see what the time trend is. And you can see that something
happened in the 1970s where electoral volatility
was at its historical high. We’re now at the historic low. Five states switched
sides in this election, which would be about 10%. So, if you just plot that over here, we haven’t put it on this yet. Oh, we did! Zach updated this. I said, “Zach, can you
update this quickly?” And he surely did and he
emailed it me so, 2016 you see. The elections 2000,
2004, 2008, 2012, or 2016 show among the lowest rates of states switching sides in US history. Now, what’s the other period that shows that low level of volatility? Remember 1876 and 1888, the Gilded Age? That’s the other trough that you see. So, there are two periods here in which we have very low
electoral volatility where the states are locked into their patterns of partisan support. You can see this in a continuous variable, which doesn’t just take a state and measures did it flip sides or not but measures how much did it change, a percentage of votes cast from the previous presidential election. So, these are all box plots, you see, of all the states in this election that, the numbers in the year
axis are very small, but, the box plots by year of the range of which the states switched their votes, changed their votes from
the previous election and you get the same thing,
which is we’re in a period of very low electoral volatility. States aren’t moving very much in the Democratic/Republican
direction in recent elections. The only other historical parallel would be in the Gilded Age. I’m gonna talk about
Congress for a few minutes. There’s another interesting trend that I think you can juxtapose with this and that is polarization in
the House and in the Senate. We measure polarization,
there are a couple political scientists named
Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal and if you’re really a political junkie as I expect most of you are, go to their website, They’ve, over the decades, had
a series of graduate students who have coded every
vote ever cast by anybody who ever served in the US House or Senate, all the roll call votes, yays or nays, and you can factor, analyze,
and basically you see how often groups of people
vote with each other and you can end up placing every person who ever served in the House or Senate on an ideological scale and then, compare them
to each other over time because several of them will
serve multiple congresses and we end up what are, we
call them nominate scores. The scale here goes from
negative six to positive six, the numbers themselves don’t matter but the relative positions do, okay? This shows the average member
of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the US Senate on this nominate scale over time. What’s happened is that
the Republican Party has moved to the right, further than it’s ever been in history. The Democratic Party was
much more liberal back in the 1870s, 1880s, and has
become more conservative. But the parties now are further apart, the average Democrat and
the average Republican in the Senate than they’ve ever been. Now, I start with the Senate
because one of the explanations that you’ll hear for party polarization is that it’s due to redistricting. State lines don’t get redrawn, so it’s not due to redistricting. Polarization isn’t due to redistricting. There’s something else going on. If you look in the House, where this redistricting
explanation maybe could work, you see kinda the same pattern, which is the Republicans and Democrats are further apart now
than they’ve ever been, and the Republicans have been moving a little further to the right than the Democrats have to the left. Now, if you just measure
the difference between that average Democrat and
that average Republican, and then, plot that over time, what you get in the red line is the gap between the parties in the House and the blue line is the gap between the parties in the Senate. We are now in Congress or
we, members of Congress, are now more polarized than they’ve ever been, going back to the 1870s. Now, this graph produced
by Poole and Rosenthal doesn’t go all the way back to
the founding of the Republic because there was this issue
of slavery up to the 1860s that was another divisive issue, perhaps even more so than
this economic left/right. So, the parties are further apart now than they’ve ever been in Congress and it’s true in both
the House and the Senate, and the distance between
the parties looks like, where’s the other period where
you see massive polarization? Back in the Gilded Age. So, the period in the 1920s through 1970s, which is, including me, most
of our political memories, are among the least polarized
in American history. So, the parties are
polarized and the states are locked into their
competitive positions in presidential elections. Now, there are a couple
similarities between the Gilded Age, but what else did the Gilded Age and the present day, they have in common? High income inequality. Growing populism, which culminated, at least in the Gilded Age, with the 1896 candidacy of William Jennings Bryan. I’m not comparing Trump to Bryan, but the populism seems to be there. Only, the difference now
is that the electoral map, the red states and blue states, are almost exactly switched from where they were in the 1890s. Congress has clearly polarized. I want to talk a little
bit about what happened, which is, in the Congressional election, there wasn’t much change at all. I think there are few themes that I take away from this election and one is, that most of the pundits will say this was an antiestablishment election. It wasn’t. It was an establishment election because the establishment is Congress and most of its members were reelected. There was very little change
in the composition of Congress. The Democrats picked up two seats so we now have 51
Republicans, 48 Democrats, and there used to be two Independents but when Bernie Sanders ran as a Democrat for president, I guess he’s now a Democrat or at least, he’s counted as such. Angus King of Maine is one
Independent in the Senate and he caucuses with the Democrats. So, a 51 to 48 edge for the Democrats. And the House is now 239 to 193, which means the Republicans lost somewhere between five and six seats, and there’s still a few
that are being counted. Including in that loss
is that 18 Democrats retired, compared to 25 Republicans. So, the Republicans were
suffering more retirements. That’s about seven additional retirements when we figure this, the
Republicans lost about seven seats, then you could say that in the aggregate it’s not that the Republicans lost, but that they left or they retired. Now, this establishment pattern was not followed in New Hampshire, where we replaced one of our senators and one of our members of Congress. Or we could say one half of our congressional delegation got replaced, which put us as an
outlier among the states. Very few states, only Illinois switched, voted out an incumbent,
where Tammy Duckworth, a Democrat beat a Republican, Mark Kirk. And there only a few handful of seats for the House of Representatives
that switched parties. So, New Hampshire bucked the
establishment trend in a way of the incumbents winning reelection. One of the things that we’ll
look for in coming days is how will the Republicans
who opposed Donald Trump reconcile with him, within his own party? There are a number of Republicans who openly opposed Donald Trump and we’ll have to see what they
do over the next few months. Another trend in this election is this wasn’t just an
establishment election, it was a national election. And I’m not talking
much about Congress now as much as I am about the presidency. Now, Tip O’Neill once said
that all politics is local. In this election, all
politics was national. Why so? Because over the last few
weeks of the election, really over the last few days, we saw a decline in Clinton support that wasn’t just in a few states. It wasn’t just in the battleground states. It seemed to have been wide. A couple points lower in New Hampshire, a couple points lower in Ohio, in Pennsylvania, in
Wisconsin, in Michigan. When you see a tide like that that’s hitting all the states, you know that the effect
isn’t local, it’s national. This was in a way, a national election. Political scientists will debate whether the release of
Comey’s letter to Congress and more importantly,
the media coverage of it, followed by the media coverage of the FBI deciding not to press charges, somehow depressed Clinton turnout across the board, across
a number of states. Third, this was an international election and it wasn’t an international election just because of allegations that Russia was tampering in our elections or that WikiLeaks was tampering. Rather, it was an international election because as much as the
ascendants of Donald Trump may be about American exceptionalism, it’s also part of the Brexit phenomenon, which is the rise of global populism in response to globalization
and multiculturalism. We were following the
British in this context and we’re also probably
following other parts of Europe, which is we are a part of this global tide against globalization. So, this was an establishment election, it was a national election, and it was an international election. Let me close with one
other thing that I think that will put this election in context. In 2008, the Republican candidate, it was John McCain, won 60 million votes. In 2012, Mitt Romney won 61 million votes. Donald Trump just won a
little over 59 million votes. Let’s say it goes up to 60 million votes as the votes are counted. So, the Republican votes in the presidential
elections in the last three went from 60 million to
61 million to 60 million. Donald Trump didn’t get any more votes than his predecessors
on the Republican side. In 2008, 69 million people
voted for Barack Obama. In 2012, 66 million. In 2016, so far, Hillary
Clinton’s won 60 million votes. Nine million Democratic votes disappeared just in the aggregate. No Republican votes, but nine million Democratic votes disappeared. Now, if you put that in the context of if one person out of 100 had switched sides, that Nate Silver quote, the other way to think about it is if nine million out of the roughly
120, 130 million who vote, you can say that’s not
even one out of 100. It’s less than 1%. If those Democrats who hadn’t
voted somehow had voted or if the potential Democratic voters who didn’t vote had somehow
been brought to the polls, then this election probably
wouldn’t have been close. So, where are those nine million
missing Democratic votes? What’s even more concerning
is that this is happening at a time when the population,
at least demographically, is becoming more Democratic looking, if you think about the
Democratic coalition. I heard an interesting
statistic the other day of children under the
age of four in the US, a majority are not white, right? So, there’s this coming
tide of non-white voters, of people of color who are not, if we’re thinking for 20,
30, 40 years down the road, what the party coalitions will look like. The electorate will be
very, very different. Now, we’re gonna come up against a midterm election in two years and the party of the president usually loses seats in Congress
in midterm elections so, the Democrats among you, I think the silver lining that you can look at here is that if historic patterns follow, then there’s probably going to be a shift in the House
and the Senate in 2018. Probably a shift in the
House and the Senate in 2018. Potentially a massive loss of seats by the Republican Party in
the House and the Senate except, you have to get
those nine million votes back in the midterm election and Democrats tend not to turn out as well in midterm elections as Republicans. So, the challenge for Democrats is find those votes and get them back. The challenge for Republicans is take that 60 million and add to it. I’ll stop there. (applauding) – I’m gonna talk a bit about the what happened at the state level, here, and pursue some of the same themes, in terms of some things changing, some things staying the same. So, the pre-election
numbers look like this. That is there were 30 states controlled by the Republican Party, there were 12 states controlled by the Democratic Party and seven of them have split control. After the election, 32 states
now have Republican control, 13 states Democratic, and
three states have splits and I’ve got New York up there. We haven’t quite figured out
what’s going on in that area. That’s important to understand
that the underpinning, the underlying political environment that leads to presidential elections and leads to congressional elections is based out of the state legislatures and what they can do and what they do and there’s a disproportionate share of those being held by Republicans and I think that’s
important to understand, in terms of the ground game or any kind of foundation under which, upon which you build
political party momentum. It certainly has its
impact on the redistricting when it comes to the legislative seats in the House of Representatives. So, important to keep that in mind. On the governor side, not
a whole lot of movement but, close to home, a
whole lot of movement. So, there were 31 governorships
prior to the election in the Republican hands,
18 in Democratic hands, and one Independent in Alaska. 12 seats were open. At the end of the election, a net gain of three for the Republicans and those were in the following states. We’re probably gonna have, it like North Carolina’s
gonna go Democratic. McCrory’s basically not in the lead but by literally thousands of votes and over 10 million cast. So, not a whole lot of volatility going on at the gubernatorial
level but still, the deck is stacked in favor
of the Republican Party overall of having almost 2/3 of the gubernatorial seats
held in their hands. What happened here in New
Hampshire and in Vermont, explains half of the, you know, two of the three seats gain right here and I think that’s rather interesting to see how voters make decisions. So, we created an entire congressional delegation of Democrats in New Hampshire and then, proceeded to have a governor, an entire House, an entire Senate, an executive council in Republican hands. Same, Vermont came one
county away from being the second, the only of one of two states that would have an entire
county voting Democratic. So, Massachusetts was the only
state in the 2016 elections where every county voted Democratic. Oklahoma’s the only Republican state that where every county voted Republican but, Vermont came one close to that. So, a lot of different patterns going on out there in terms of where the voters are
and where they’re voting and how they’re not so
much being cross-pressured, but feel the freedom to be able to vote in New Hampshire to
have basically, runaway, virtually non-competitive House races and every, you know, the Republicans doing what they had in the past. A razor thin presidential election, a razor thin Senate race,
and a governors race, comparatively speaking,
that wasn’t razor thin and that Republican wins. So, there’s a lot going
on in the electorate all at the same time of having people not simply straight ticket voting and taking a lot of
different approaches to it. There were a bunch of ballot
measures on the ballots, as well, across the United States. These are some of the bigger ones. We’ve doubled our number of states with recreational marijuana and so, we’ve added four to
the mix, from four to eight. Minimum wage raises were
in Arizona, Colorado, and Ohio, $12 by 2020, and in Washington, $13.50 over the next four years. Some gun regulation in California and Nevada, background checks, and Washington state passed a law where judges will be able
to deny gun possession to what are deemed to be
mentally ill individuals. And then, the death penalty
reinstating it in Nebraska and California, basically
speeding up appeals and in Oklahoma, basically allowing all methods to be constitutional, as long as it’s not in violation of the federal Constitution,
in terms of executions. So, I want to go back and sort of look at the map that we’ve all seen. In the Valley News this
morning, this was the map, the sort of the county level data. Again, there are problems with dealing with county level data that is, there are Nebraska counties, basically, there are more cows
there than there are people, so it’s not really a good measure but it is a sense, the sort of look at the lay of the land of the geopolitics of party politics in the
United States in 2016. It used to be, and still
holding that as sort of a bicoastal Democratic party
and the Mississippi River where you find blocks
of Democratic support, but a growing number of states where it’s getting redder and redder and what I wanted to do
is, rather than going back to the Gilded Age, just
take us back to 1976. Here’s the same map. (audience murmuring) So, we’re not talking about
ancient history, here. That is the ’76 election,
a pretty close one, a two point difference where
Jimmy Carter wins by two points and yet, this is what America looked like. So, it’s a quite different picture over not a terribly long period of time. So, what are some of the explanations as to how we got from that to that? A lot of it has to do with what the constituencies are
of the two major parties and who’s in and who’s out
and who are the priority lists and who aren’t on the priority list. Now again, demographically,
the United States in 1976 was very different than it was today. In 2016, things are very different. So, for the first, last
year was the last year that white Christians were a majority in the America population. That day will never pass
again in the United States. In 1960, 90% of the American
population was white. So, in terms of looking
for diverse coalitions within electorates, there wasn’t
much diversity to look for. And now, it’s a very different picture. So, it seems to me that one
of the explanations here, and it’s sort of what’s been, a lot of people have been
putting their finger on is this notion of the
non-college educated white voter, which in the New Deal coalition was one of the building blocks, one of the foundations
of the Democratic Party included that group of individuals. And so, if that was the case, and it was still pretty
much in position in 1976, what’s happened over
the last 25 or 30 years to get us to where we are today? And I think a lot of things can explain that in terms of the way the Democratic Party has organized itself and did organize itself, I mean, ’76, the reason why I think
it’s an important year is that that’s the year after
some of the major reforms in the party itself, in
terms of the McGovern-Fraser happening after the ’68 convention, where everything sort of got blown apart and reconstituting the way in which party leadership was established. It also opened the doors for open primaries and things like that. But, I think part of,
at that point in time, or prior to that point in time, I think the way the party
formulated its winning coalitions did include working class individuals and in that point in time and earlier, that was largely white individuals. I think you’ve seen as years pass, another reason why I point to ’76 is go to the ’76 Democratic Party platform. It was the first time
in which these reforms that took place created instead of what used to be back in the
1800s, basically a broadside, where you basically list
what the party stood for and you posted it in the town square and it could be read in five minutes. Now, in 2016, they’re 58 pages
long and no one reads them. But, in 1976 was the first time that the Democratic Party created planks for various special interests and organized interest groups
within their political party and I would make a plausible argument from that point forward, the way that the party thought of itself as it’s basically, the sum
of various component parts of which organizations within the Democratic coalition
were part of that movement and as a result of that, I
think working class whites didn’t have that same, you
used the word, identity, to sort of connect or conceptualize what’s going on in this cycle. They didn’t have the same kind of identity and I think as a result of that, they went from being an essential element, essential foundational
element of the party to basically, being taken for granted as an essential element of that party, to basically, benign neglect, to basically, kicking to the curb, to say, “You know what, in our calculus, “it’s not so important anymore “that we include that group
of people into our coalition.” And that left them
wandering in the wilderness and I think two people figured that out. One was Bernie Sanders
and one was Donald Trump. That they have, not a great
deal in common politically or policy-wise, but in terms of looking at a constituency that’s been underserved or totally unserved in this population and said, “I’m gonna speak to you.” And I think it’s again,
if it’s cosmopolitanism that wins the day, then it’s going to be no real room for working class
whites when once upon a time, that was a really key element
to the Democratic party. So, in looking for more
votes on the Democratic side, it’ll be interesting to see, do they just stick with the demographic changes and say, “All right, no, we’re
basically gonna be a party “that looks to minority populations to be “the cornerstones of the
party for the 21st century.” Or do you say, “Welcome
back,” to those voters that were mobilized by Donald Trump? ‘Cause it’s not exactly a great
fit on the Republican side, that he and the Republican leadership have a lot to deal with, in terms of what that membership base looks like, of who voted for Donald Trump, who voted for all those House members and Senators to come back and have such a small margin of change in this election. I’m a little less sanguine about a huge sweep in the next midterm elections. Just as the Republicans had a bulk of the seats this time around, the Democrats have the bulk of the seats up in the next cycle. So, they’re going to have many more to protect than the Republicans are and I think there’s gonna be
much more targeted effort. The final thing I want to say on the Republican side is, but for the RNC. The savior of the Republican, the prime architects of the Republican victory were not Donald Trump, they were the Republican
National Committee because ground game-wise,
Hillary had him beaten in spades. There was no way that he had
the ground game that he had. If you go to Florida in Labor Day, Hillary Clinton had 51 offices open. Donald Trump had one. A month later, there were 60 offices open, they were all RNC offices, and across the United
States, they had 315 offices and 7500 employees out there doing what normally presidential campaigns do. But, Donald Trump never did any of that and basically, Reince Priebus and all of those folks picked up the ball and gave him the ground
game that they didn’t have. So, there’s a bit of a
story behind the story in terms of organization mattering. If you simply look at the Trump campaign, you say you can get away without it, and in fact, you can’t. That they had the ground game, the Republican Party delivered the goods and made it possible for that to happen. So, I’ll stop there and hopefully, we have some time for
questions, which we do. Thank you. (applauding) Microphones coming down. We’ll start here and
then, we’ll go to there. So, one is here, two is there. – Hi, the shocking
statistic for me is these nine million disappearing
Democratic voters. I mean, that’s, I haven’t
seen that in the press. Do we know that there
are nine million voters who voted Democratic and disappeared? Or did a whole bunch of
them switch to Republicans and did other Republicans not show up? Can you slice and dice that number? Which is actually 7
1/2% of the electorate. It’s not from one in
100, it’s 7 1/2 in 100. – Just because there were nine million votes that disappeared, that doesn’t mean nine
million people switched sides, nor does it mean that nine million people decided not to show up. It’s just in the aggregate
and we don’t know, we can’t infer from that
the individual behavior. What I’m looking at, but I don’t have yet, is I’ve heard reports that turnout was low in the suburbs
around Philadelphia, and Columbus, Ohio, especially among middle-aged women, the group that Hillary
Clinton should have won. And if turnout was lower among middle-aged women in the suburban areas, that would account for her losses in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin. I can’t confirm whether that’s true because you don’t really have individual level data on turnout. We don’t know who showed
up and who didn’t. That’s something we’ll have
to parse out over the next, it’ll take months, probably, years. But, that seems like
what we call deactivation or demobilization, when you have people who are predisposed to
vote for a candidate and then, they don’t show up. Despite this tremendous
Clinton ground game, there was something that kept people from liking her enough to vote for her, which is the same problem
we saw in 2008 when she ran, presidential elections when
she ran against Barack Obama and also, when she was running against Bernie Sanders in the primaries. – [Audience Member] Do you have
any study data for instance, on African Americans who voteed,
perhaps disproportionately, for Barack Obama and that didn’t show up? – So, we don’t, without
the individual level data, we can’t tell until we
have the voter file. – But, Hillary won 88% of
the African American vote compared to, I think it was 92% for Gore and there was a big debate in 2000 about whether Gore was not as appealing to African American voters
as he should’ve been and that’s compared to 95% for Obama so, Hillary Clinton did not
do as well as she should have or was to be expected
among African Americans. – But that, can I add one thing, Ron? – Yeah, sure. – One key point though, is that may not be responsible
for the underperformance because it’s not necessarily about the margin in candidate
choice among black voters that we see in the exit
poll, it’s the proportion of the electorate that’s African American and again, we don’t see that yet, but the margins in heavily
black areas where we have aggregate vote totals
suggest under performance, but again, in terms of breaking this down, there are people who
switched from Obama to Trump and then, there are people who stayed home on the Democratic side and people who came out on the Republican side. You can get a lot of, there are a lot of different ways you can
get that kind of a shift. – Just a quick comment on the same topic and then we can move on
’cause we don’t have the data, but also, what’s the
impact of the voter ID laws and the voter suppression that
we’ve heard so much about? – It seems to be more across,
a more of an across the board effect on, of decreased
Democratic turnout, so there is evidence from prior elections that those laws can reduce turnout but, Rick Hasen at UC Irvine who’s one of the country’s leading experts in this just wrote a piece today about how we can’t attribute the
Democratic decline to this because we saw the same sort of decrease in vote share in states that either had the same laws as 2012 or even expanded access. – Right here. Go there, then here. – [Audience Member] I wonder
if you could say a word about the role of money in
this election campaign, particularly when you had so
much free airtime for Trump, particularly through the early stages. – Yeah, I’d urge you to go to a website. Just Google Tom Patterson at Harvard. Some fascinating stuff
about the primary cycle and just how disproportionate the coverage was with Donald Trump and then, that pivot once
he got the nomination, in terms of the both the
size of the coverage, the volume of coverage, and the positive versus negative coverage prior to the nomination, getting the nomination, and then, afterwards. So, it’s really kind of stunning. – [Audience Member] What about money? – The money, well, we
witnessed the most expensive, it cost $200 a vote in the Senate race here in New Hampshire, over a $130 million
spent and 90 plus percent of it came from outside the state. Flipping on election
night across the channels, I happened to fall on Karl Rove who claimed that Crossroads spent $35 million in New Hampshire. The DSCC probably spent more than that so, I’m not sure whether
that drives things, you know, it created a razor
thin election for sure, but I’m not sure that money
was the big story this time. – Yeah, I would take few things out of, few conclusions about money. Number one is, an important
that could’ve happened is that if the Libertarian Party
gotten 5% more of the vote, it would’ve qualified for
federal matching funds and it didn’t. The amount of money that a
party can get by qualifying for federal matching funds
is no longer relevant. The major party candidates have to raise so much more than that that essentially, campaign
finance laws are moot. And I don’t think that
the money mattered as much because free media, social
media now, matters so much more. Twitter and Facebook are virtually free and that’s how candidates
are reaching voters now and also, through free
airtime, so that the campaigns, we’re in a new era of campaign spending. It is cheaper and easier to reach voters now than it’s ever been before. We can target, the campaigns can target them better with advances in technology so, the campaigns know more about voters than they ever have, regardless
of how much money they have. – And just to add, can I just
add one quick point, Ron? This election is a great example of the myth that money can buy elections. Jeb Bush lit $100 million on fire and he was not the Republican nominee. Hillary Clinton significantly
outspent Donald Trump and it did not win her the election. That money probably helps
a little bit on the margin, but it wasn’t enough
to make the difference. – [Audience Member] How
do you gain those voters who joined with Bernie
Sanders and with Donald Trump, while still maintaining minority support within the Democratic party? – I think that’s the
million dollar question. Is it A, are they interested in expanding that base and including those people? I think that’s a conversation that the Democratic Party leadership needs to have and Bernie better be at the table when that conversation takes place because I think that group was underserved by the Clinton campaign. Let’s go here. – Coming back to the issue of money, pardon, with all due respect, I’m not sure you guys watch enough TV because I have a Vermont
cable, or satellite dish, and so, I saw Kelly Ayotte
and Tachs and Hesson, I mean, every commercial break in every ballgame for
months and months on end, so, the 35 million, it
sounds very plausible. About a year ago, getting
ready for the election, I was trying to read the Dark
Money, the Jane Mayer book. I think the Koch brothers had $800 million they had amassed supposedly. Where did that go? – They didn’t spend, in terms of, they didn’t spend for Trump. They spent– – That’s what I’m saying,
where did that go? – Well, I don’t think
they spent most of it. – Right, they didn’t spend it. – [Audience Member] States. – Some in states, some to super PACs supporting other candidates. – Right, I mean, it’s the notion that the people involved in the process are being crowded out by that money. I mean, all the airtime was basically bought up by external players in the game and that to me, is a sad commentary on the way the system works and I’m not sure how you fix that but certainly, homegrown,
I’m all for homegrown money. If a person in either
Vermont or New Hampshire wants to support a candidate for office but the notion that these Washington based organizations can basically, literally, there was no room. I think in the 1986 Arizona race was the first time in
American political history where outside spending trumps both party candidates in a
congressional election. And now, it’s the norm
where neither candidate gets to say the majority of
the things that are said. Everything else gets crowded out. – But, if we can make an
important point, here, that this is in part a
function of the jurisprudence and the campaign finance
regulations that are in place. So, the parties can’t
raise and spend this money but it’s been allowed under existing campaign finance jurisprudence and so, it’s going to
these outside groups. That makes the parties weak and it creates this dependence on
outside independent groups instead of running through the parties. Weak parties are unable to
constrain their candidates, they have less leverage over them, they’re more likely to be
in service to candidates, rather than running as
functioning organizations, as we’ve especially seen
on the Republican side, so, this is in part a policy
choice that we’ve made. It’s not something inevitable. – Let’s go back over here. – [Audience Member] In the 20th century, can you explain the rationale for the electoral college over
a national popular vote? (laughing) – Presidency scholar? – It’s rigged. (laughing) The intent was to make
presidential candidates, well, the original intent was to keep these choices out of the hands of voters and in the hands of political elites who were selected by various
elites within the state so, presidential electors were not supposed to be beholden to the public. But, in the 1820s, changed
to kind of partisan slating of these presidential electors and the justification now is to ensure that presidential candidates
have broad geographic support, rather than campaigning only
in the major urban areas. But the system, the way that
the state boundaries are drawn, gives an advantage to Republicans because they’re just more, the Republican support is diffuse, Democratic
support is concentrated, so Democrats win urban
areas by large amounts, Republicans win these big
states in the Great Plains and Midwest by smaller amounts, but you add it all together, it gives them an electoral college advantage and the irony of it is,
that the way the states are drawn in the west that
produces this advantage is due to the French, who drew square boundaries geographically. The east coast is English based, you draw state lines
that geographic features rather than just lines of
latitude and longitude. So, the French rigged this election. (laughing) – [Audience Member] Clearly,
the Democratic Party has been dealt a devastating
blow in this election, given the results across the
board that have resulted. What would you guys say
would be the resulting recommendations that they need to take? Is it a top down overhaul? Or do they go from the ground up and try and tap into the anger that’s been seen amongst average white voters and try and retool their viewpoints? What do they do? – Well, again that’s the question Democrats are trying to figure out. I don’t think any of us can
speak for the Democratic Party. I think it’s certainly the case that the national strength of the Democratic Party in presidential elections has masked the fundamental weakness of the Democratic Party at lower levels that Ron was describing earlier. The Democratic bench, as
a result, is very weak. It’s very limited, it’s small. It’s concentrated in areas
that, on the coasts especially, and it may be lacking in
candidates who are well positioned to appeal to a
broader swath of the public. And so, obviously, you can’t pick and choose to do all these
things at the same time. You have to do the national
and the state politics but, the fundamental weakness of the Democratic Party at the local and state level is going to haunt them if they don’t correct it. Now, people tend to get sick of the party in power, so we will see, but the point that Dean made about the consistent polarization in the states may lock a lot of these states in place. So, the challenge Democrats face is, how do they win in places where polarization is moving down ticket? It used to be people
would vote for a different party at the presidential
level than Congress. And then, it was President and Congress, but not your state officials. And now, it’s going all the way down. And so, Democrats have to figure out in this huge number of states, where it’s not especially
favorable to them, how do they overcome that
and I don’t think they know. – Let me add, one opportunity and one problem for the Democrats. The opportunity is post-Clinton. The taint of Clinton was
on the 2000 election. Al Gore couldn’t run away from him and lost the electoral college and Hillary Clinton couldn’t
run away from her last name. And I think now that the
Clinton apparatus in a way, may be gone from the Democratic Party, it creates an opportunity. Now, within the Democratic Party, I think there’ll be a debate over whether they should continue
to follow the Clinton way, which is the moderate,
be fiscally conservative compared to the rest of the party. Clinton and a number of
other Southern governors, like Chuck Robb in the 1980s, came up with this strategy of moderation
and it was successful. Even Barack Obama in a lot of ways, was following that strategy. I think a lot of Democrats will say, “Look what the Republicans did not “just in Trump, but in Ronald Reagan.” They picked somebody who was out on what might be considered at the
time, the wing of the party, but had a very forceful message. So, is the next Democratic presidential candidate better to be a moderate or somebody like a Bernie Sanders who is out further to the left. American politics is played between the 40-yard lines, if we
use a football analogy. Bernie Sanders was out
there at the 20-yard line and is that the direction
that the Democrats go? And I think Donald Trump was on a different playing field altogether. (laughing) – Let’s come down in front, here. If there are folks in the other rooms that want to come and ask a question, just come to the back and
we’ll queue them right up. – [Audience Member] Thank you. Yeah, so since the election, I’ve been seeing this phrase come up quite a bit, that parties are weak
but polarization is high. It does seem like one of those phrases that people pull out to explain something that was so unexpected
but, in listening to you, all of you talk, there seems to be more, it seems like you’re saying more that there was this very defined group that was trying to find
someone to listen to them and I was wondering how can you square both, sort of, ideas? – Well, I think, the exit polls had a question on there about, “Do you want the future of American policy “to move in the direction
that Barack Obama created, “more liberal than Barack Obama, “or more conservative than Barack Obama?” And 22% of those, 17% of the
exit polls respondents said, “More liberal than Barack Obama.” And 22% of them voted for Donald Trump. So, that might be capturing where some of the disaffected Bernie Sanders folks went. So, I don’t know. – Bernie, no, no, no. The Democrat Party ID is so strong, the Bernie Sanders people
who came out overwhelmingly, I’m confident we will find
when we get the full data, overwhelmingly voted for Clinton. I am quite, the polling we have from prior suggests that 90-plus percent of them were going to vote for Clinton. But, I think the quote that you’re talking about actually though, is usually used to explain
something different, which is the weak control the parties have over candidates like Trump. So, the original article,
if you pull it out, by a political scientist name Julia Azari, is about the challenge we face when partisanship is so strong, that if anyone has the party nominee, is anointed as the party nominee, and has that dear R next to their name, they will be supported overwhelmingly, almost no matter what they do. Like, you could think of this election as Donald Trump testing the strength of party ID again and again and again and what he showed was he
could do almost nothing to push those Republicans away from him, despite what seemed to be a tremendous effort on his part, right? (laughing) So, that’s quite remarkable and it means that the stakes in primaries
are incredibly high because there’ll be so little crossover voting in the general election. – But, we heard Reagan Democrat being used mostly in the postmortem, but a little bit before the election. Is that just a fallacy? – They’re gone. I think they’re gone. Yeah, I mean, there were
folks who voted for Obama. The Reagan Democrats left the Democrat Party a long time ago. I think there were folks
who voted for Obama in the upper Midwest
who may switched over. So, but this is Trump
standing for change, right? Or some kind of dissatisfaction with where the country is going. That might be a better, more liberal, people don’t know what liberal means but that may be what that’s picking up, that Ron’s talking about. – Let me, I think there is
a group of voters out there that have clearly been left
behind by globalization and they don’t know where to go. So, they tried the Democrats, didn’t work. Their lives didn’t improve. They tried the Republicans, didn’t work. Their lives didn’t improve. I don’t think they have a
party identification right now. They’re experimenting. Trump is their latest experiment and if in four to eight years
it doesn’t work for them, they’re up for grabs again. – [Ron] Let’s go here. – [Audience Member] I see there’s– – [Audience Member] Speak up. – [Audience Member] I see those
Republican forgotten people. They’re on their own now, politically. They used to have jobs, high-paying jobs, they belonged to unions. The unions told them who to vote for and they had a group that they belonged to socially and politically. Now, they’re on their own and
I think they’re free to go to somebody like Trump,
who appeals to them. They could’ve even been Democrats before but that Democratic Party
doesn’t hold them anymore. That’s the way I see it. – You know, unions have
declined in their membership but another thing the unions did was they wove together black and white in ways that you don’t see now. There’s a great movie called Matewan, if any of you want to look, you know, it’s about the weaving of black and white in 1920s in West Virginia, which is now solidly Republican. Used to be solidly Democratic
and unions served that role, but their decline as an institution means that blacks and whites politically, working class, no longer have their interests together, no longer even meet. – If I can just add one thing, one is, a lot of the places that swung Republican don’t have any factories. They’re quite rural. So, this is not, if this were
an industrial decline story, we would see a different map. An analysis of Trump supporters
during the primaries finds that exposure to trade,
direct exposure to trade and immigration were
actually not associated with Trump support in the primaries. Trump supporters actually
had high incomes, although they were less,
they had on average, lower levels of education than other Republican primary voters. So, it’s not as simple a story. I think it’s a more symbolic kind of story than about direct experience with factory closures or immigration. There are places like that. There are stories like that. But, it’s a more symbolic
identity type story and we just have to talk about
race in the context of this. We’ve been dancing around the issue. It must be said that racial resentment was strongly associated with Trump support and the way he ran this
race, weirdly may have coated more racial than
even Obama’s races. So, remember I showed you that map. Most of the country did not, the heavily white counties did not
swing against Obama, except in that swath of Appalachia, but we saw something
different in this election. We saw what is this national identity feeling that people have that
is often associated with race in uncomfortable ways for the country. It doesn’t mean it is all racism but that dimension is
powerful and symbolic. It may be more than just direct experience with things like factory closures. – Right here. We’ll go, you next, yup. – [Audience Member] Do I go? – Yup. – [Audience Member] So, going off of that, like, how do we move forward? Like, having seen how
divided our country is based on ideology, not
just political policy, how do we move forward knowing that there is this large
majority of our country that maybe doesn’t
believe what Trump said, but certainly validated it
by voting him into office? – Well, I think the first thing is, Donald Trump at his core, is a businessman and that means ultimately compromising, looking at the data, and going where the evidence suggests where the deal is good. If you’re a Democrat, I think in a way, Ted Cruz was potentially
more dangerous than. Donald Trump is not
that kind of ideologue. So even if you are, you know, after this election,
soul searching and down, I would say Trump is probably a pragmatist and he also, I think,
will have the gravitas to stand up to the wing of the party that might pull him further to the right. I don’t think that’s where
he is intellectually. His instincts are not
very far to the right but I think he would have
some pretty serious debates with some of the Republicans in the House and Senate over a number of issues. So, that’s the hope and
then, the Democrats come away from this thinking they
too have to compromise and we get back to playing
between the 40-yard lines. – I think some of it has to do
with what he cares about too. I think on things that he doesn’t care about, he’s willing to just let go and I fear that the Supreme Court is that’s where he’s gonna give away the store and not care about it. That, all right, the
religious evangelical turnout was, I think, a story not told as much as it probably could have. They have only one thing in mind, the future of the Supreme Court ’cause they had to hold their
nose really, really tight to vote for a guy like Donald Trump. But, they did and I don’t think he really cares a whole lot about that and therefore, would be
willing, “Okay, fine, “we need to appease
that group, here it is.” I think on things he cares about, that’s where he’s gonna dig in and say no to the, whether it’s the Freedom Caucus or whoever but when he doesn’t care,
I don’t think it matters. Right here. – [Audience Member] You mentioned the nine million voters that left. I heard on the radio that the
percentage of the electorate that turned out was only 54%, which is pretty normal, I think. Why wouldn’t this election
bring out more people? Have we figured that out? – Have we ever had any two
presidential candidates with lower favorable
ratings going into it? – No. – I’m actually stunned that
the turnout was where it was. Could we get any more flawed candidates than the two that we had? I’m just, that would be my response. – Oh yeah, so I was gonna, I have polling. Polling piece of the
favorables are at record highs, the percentage of the
public that said they were satisfied with their choice of candidates was at historic lows and by like, something
like 20 percentage points. A huge decline. – [Audience Member] You talked about what was so interesting, this
wasn’t an industrial decline, but the decline was seen in the, it was a people with higher income but lower level of
education, and when I put that with the number of
non-college educated, especially white men, we
haven’t talked about gender yet, and that to me, the decline of the power of the male in this country. I’m wondering if that was a
factor and can it be studied? – So, non-college women
came home for Trump too. So, it’s not a clear gender story. The gender gap is relatively consistent. Trump did a little better with men and about the same with women as Romney. – [Audience Member] Would that white be attributable to evangelical? – We don’t know yet. – It’s married women tend
to vote more Republican so that the gender gap
is really a marriage gap and I think that you
have lot of two-income working class man and woman
who both voted for Trump in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, and Wisconsin. – [Audience Member] I see
three different strains of voter motivation in this election and I was curious if you could address what you think is strongest,
personal, policy or partisan? You’ve talked about how
states appear to be locked in in this election to the
parties that they voted with but then, you also look at
the high levels of distrust and the talk about temperament, which looks to me to be more personal, and then, you also have the movements of anti-Clinton and anti-Trump, which to me look to be policy driven. So, which of those do
you think is dominant and if they do contradict each other, how is that played out? – I think on the, I’ll
take the third piece. I think my colleague, Charlie Wheelan, was disappointed in this election. If you’ve got terribly flawed candidates and no one shows that third option, or comparatively fewer
people chose the third and fourth options, I think that gives third party movements of
any kind pause in this. People stayed home in one or the other party, not drifting away. Maybe it was Johnson’s,
again, he was equally flawed. (laughing) But Ross Perot got 19 million
votes back when he ran. He was not an exactly
unflawed candidate either, but that didn’t appear this time, and you would have thought, given those two flawed candidates, someone could’ve driven a
Mack truck down the middle of this electorate and captured votes. – I would just say party. This is party, right? Trump, like I said, Trump had more, was seen as having disqualifying
personal characteristics and a lack of experience and yet, his party was absolutely locked in. Those Bernie Sanders voters
came home for Clinton. But, the important thing to think about is party is not about policy. Obviously, it’s associated with it, but our understanding of party is it’s a more emotional
kind of attachment and in particular, negative partisanship plays an increasingly important role in understanding the kinds of choices people make politically in
the positions they hold, and that’s increased over time. So, if you think about why
people ended up where they did, the best way to think about it is who did they hate more, right? That’s where I would start and I think that helped lock most people in place, despite any reservations
they had about policy or personal characteristics. – But, you’ve asked about one of the most enduring debates in American politics and I’m gonna take a different position, which is party is about policy, mostly. Even if it’s about
identity and socialization, it’s largely about what
issues we care about and party’s like a summary
of that for most people. But, for, so for about
80% of the electorate. But, for the late deciders,
the ones who decide elections, party either is a filter through which we see personality and issues, so there’s some people who don’t know a lot about issues, don’t
care a lot about them, but they look at their party leaders and then, they follow what
their party leaders say. And then, there’s that small group, maybe five to 10% of voters who really determine the outcome of elections, who are focused on personality. They liked Trump. The late deciders voted
for Trump, not Clinton. They liked Trump better than Clinton. Now, we don’t know if it’s
because of the Comey letter and we don’t know if it’s because of doubts about Hillary’s voracity, but they already had doubts about Trump. I just think Trump, in the end, was a more appealing personality to those late deciding
voters than Clinton was. – [Ron] Here. – [Audience Member] So, is the– – [Ron] Wait for the mic, please. – [Audience Member] What do you expect in the first hundred days, will the policy that comes out of that be more driven by
Trump or by Congress, and what do you think the principle things to happen will be, the
most important ones? – They’re figuring this out right now so, bizarrely, Trump’s victory speech was mostly about infrastructure spending, which was probably came
a surprise to people who voted for him for the
symbolic identity reasons. (laughing) Now, the Republicans in Congress don’t seem so thrilled about that. They’re writing a big tax cut
bill so, some mix of tax cuts and Affordable Care Act
repeal would be my guess, but Affordable Care Act repeal is a morass so, my guess would be
some kind of tax cuts and spending program that let’s
him distribute some goodies and then, after that, who knows. – I’d say the Trans-Pacific
Partnership is dead and Obamacare has a target on it. – Let’s go here and then,
we’ll go here, and there. – [Audience Member]
Our son just turned 30. He called from California. He says he’s really excited and all his friends are voting blue and I guess he’s in the Millennials. I don’t think that
word’s come up yet today. So, he says going forward,
things are gonna get better, and I read something about
even young Republicans on college campuses are more
blue than their parents. So, what do you think is going on and will that be a factor going forward? – Who’s got the Millennial? – You know, every time, every generation that comes of age adopts the party, usually when they come of age to vote, of the popular president at that time. So, my generation is the most Republican in the electorate right
now because of Reagan. The Millennials are the
most Democratic in the electorate now because of Obama, Clinton. I don’t think Trump is gonna
convert this generation. I think this will be an exception. I don’t see 18 to 25-year-olds
becoming Trump supporters. Maybe I’ll be wrong but
that’s just my guess. – [Ron] Can we go here? – [Audience Member] Yeah, thanks. So, my question is, how
many people ended up going down the ballot the
whole way, filling it out, and then, left the
presidential slot blank? Like, just chose not to vote
for a presidential candidate? Is that a negligible number
or is it non-negligible? – I think they had 100,000 spoiled ballots in Michigan, if I remember right. So yeah, it’s definitely non-negligible. – And lots of write-ins. Where they wrote in somebody else for, a quite a few write-ins for President. – Let’s go back over here. And then, we’ll go here. – [Audience Member] I was wondering to what extent that Congress
would support Trump, because I know there were
a lot of establishment Republicans who came out against him and he used to be a Democrat. How, like, will they be his enemy or will they work with
him to pass what he wants? – I don’t know. That’ll be interesting. Will Paul Ryan go up to
Donald Trump and say, “Here’s what we’re going to do.” And Donald Trump says, “No, no, no. “Here’s what we’re gonna do.” (laughing) I wish I could be a fly on that wall. (laughing) – I mean, this is, it’s not a once in a lifetime opportunity, a once in a generation opportunity to have unified control of Congress. So, I think a lot of
Republicans are saying if he’s willing to play ball, if he’s the deal maker that
Dean suspects he might be, then this is an opportunity to
get our whole agenda through. But again, they have no idea
what Trump actually believes or wants to pass or even
knows or cares about so, it’s–
(laughing) – But, that I think, gives
Congress the upper hand. They got the chapter and verse that goes along with the platitudes that he would launch out there. He has no idea how to, what to do after you repeal Obamacare. He doesn’t know what that next step is. I think there are members of
Congress on the Republican side who actually have an idea about that and so, I think just on
the information side, they’ve got the upper hand and he needs to get something done. So, I think there’s gonna be an interesting dialogue and back and forth, but I would, as long as Ryan can appease the interests within his caucus, and figure some consensus out there, and can go to the President
with a clear agenda and say, “We can get this done. “You’d be a fool not to take it.” I think that’s where. – And Trump has zero political experience. Zero. Never been a governor, never a legislator. Will he be Andrew Jackson
or Ulysses S. Grant? And Grant was largely a failure. Jackson, people said was an imperial. You know, neither one of
them had political acumen because they never held political office. – So, we’re gonna go here. – [Audience Member] Thank you. Your explanation of the
polls was fantastic. It’s interesting that for about a month prior to the election, with all the data that you’ve pointed out, it was never reported
that Trump had a chance. As you went through, you said there was on this side or that side and everything that the media presented
seemed to point out that Hillary was for sure the winner. And when you think of the number or the percentage of the
populous, in the voting populous, that get all their
information from the media, it seems that that may have had a determining role at that point. – So, in other words, they thought it was in the bag and stayed home? Yeah, I mean it’s one conjecture. It certainly was widely known. There are more people hearing about things like FiveThirtyEight than ever before, so does that create a weird feedback loop where that makes their
predictions less accurate because people know they think that someone like Clinton is going to win? – [Audience Member] No one ever said that Trump had a chance. – Well, I don’t think that’s the case. Again, it’s the seven in 10, eight in 10, and nine in 10, doesn’t
mean no chance, right? But, unlikely. – [Audience Member] Okay. – Right? – Let’s go here. – [Audience Member] Hi, my question is also related to gender. What exactly do you think
has been the role of sexism and misogyny and gender
roles in this election and what do you think are the implications of Hillary Clinton’s defeat and Donald Trump’s victory for
those, for American society? – After the election, Trump has to realize that for instance, the
entire New Hampshire congressional delegation is women. The leaders of our most important allies, England, Germany, South Korea, are women. And he’s already has a bad reputation so he has to fix that reputation. That’s the first issue. Was this an election
primarily about gender? Did gender play a role? I think surely it did
and it is disconcerting that Trump, we don’t want to use him as an example for my 14-year-old son. I had told him many times
during this election, “All right, here’s an
example of what you never say “and what you never do and why.” I’ve never done that, well, I guess I did with Clinton a little bit. (laughing) – [Ron] Touché. – Yeah, I mean, if I
can just add one thing. The evidence for lower level elections that our colleague, Deb Brooks, has collected and other scholars, is that voters are actually quite happy to vote for female candidates. Now, we don’t, you know, Hillary Clinton is the first major party
presidential nominee so, we don’t know if that
extends to presidency but we have lots of reasons
from these lower level elections to think voters are, in general, willing to vote for women and they don’t seem to face
an electoral penalty, right? I mean, the New Hampshire delegation is some evidence of that. – Right behind you. – [Audience Member] What
about international aspects? Did Putin affect our election? (laughs) And any insights into what’s
gonna happen internationally? I know the whole world’s
scared of this thing. – I don’t know that Putin affected the election as much as Comey. Now, maybe Putin told
Comey to release that. (laughing)
I don’t know. I think that Putin and basically, our non-allies see this as an opportunity and that’s only because they know what they were gonna
get with Hillary Clinton and they have no idea what they’re gonna get with Donald Trump. So, they may be just engaging in wishful thinking at the moment. – But this, in terms of the
international implications, I think it’s worth paying attention to what’s gonna happen in France. If Madame Le Pen becomes
the head of that country, that’s another domino
falling in that direction. Let’s go all the way in the back. – [Audience Member] What do you anticipate about the future of polarization, given the extent to which we can curate the media that we
consume, who we hear from, and does that have a disproportionate impact on either of the parties? – I think we will not see
a decline in polarization. I’m not sure we’ll see
significant increase, only because I’m not sure
how much farther we can go. But, if the Democrats start
seeking the Trump on the left and at the congressional
level, they do the same thing, we could see even more polarization. The data suggests it’s been disproportionately pulling
Republicans further to the right and it’s because I think more Republicans are locked into Republican
media sources at the moment. You know, there’s more Republican talk radio than Democratic talk radio. But, it’s not clear that
that trend will continue. I mean, maybe now Trump will create the advent of Democratic talk radio and Democrats will be the ones who are getting more of their
information from sources that are more consistent with
their more liberal opinions. I don’t know. – One quick additional point is just that that echo chamber phenomenon the data suggests is quite limited. It’s just concentrated among
those politically educated and knowledgeable people like you folks. So, the average person just doesn’t bother to watch a lot of political news, or read a lot of political
news, or to seek out news that’s consistent with
their point of view. But, the political news
audience is much more polarized because it’s disproportionately consisting of those folks who care a lot and they can help drive the parties apart, even if they’re a pretty small
proportion of the public. – Great, we have time
for one more question. – [Audience Member] Thanks, two questions. First is a comment.
– Sure. – [Audience Member] I’m in
Professor Deborah Brooks’ class and indeed, we are more
prone, the studies show, to vote for a woman
just the same as a man, but, with the studies or the
readings that we’ve seen, are also showing that we judge
women on a different level so, given that, do you think
that had Hillary Clinton been a man with the same email scandals and same everything, would she have won? Would she have beat Trump? ‘Cause I venture to guess that that might’ve influenced voters. – You know, would Joe Biden
have won this election? Would Elizabeth Warren have won this election for the Democrats? It’s hard to say. I do think it is significant that in 30 years in public life, it came down to Clinton using a private email server. That was the scandal. – [Audience Member] And then, the final one is on immigration. I came in a little bit
late so I don’t know if anybody’s asked that, but I’m afraid. So, what can happen with immigration? You know, I suspect he might go ahead and definitely sign off and repeal DAPA. I have no more hope for DAPA anymore. And so, what about the deportations
and what about anything? I mean, what can we
expect immigration-wise? – The President has a
great deal of discretion. That’s an area where Obama has exercised his executive authority and that means that it’s quite vulnerable to whatever Trump decides to do. It’s a little known fact
that Obama has actually deported record numbers of people, although he has the DAPA policy and some other policies that
are perceived as less punitive. So, yeah but, we don’t know. He has a tremendous amount
of discretion in that area. That’s one of the areas the President has the most discretion and certainly, the one that a lot of folks are thinking about right
now who could affected or know people who would be affected. – Very good. Thank you. (applauding) Thank you all for coming. Appreciate it.

  1. I expected this forum to be a serious discussion to try and understand what happened, not another leftist whining, still trying to understand what happened (but from my point of view). All the nice data put together, but done in a way pursuing the answer that I believe it should be. This is exactly what the media did and why they were so off.

  2. Most of them with the exception of Brendan were not that far off , BUT , Brendan is still trying to force the data to support his beliefs , truth is that the Trump campaign had different key messages depending on who the audience was , and in the case of the Great Lake States , it was about the export of US Mfg , and how that was tied into the resentment of the White Working Class losing their jobs due to a Government that was not advocating for them but rather for Corp profits

  3. Is there any value added to this kind of Forum?  Seems the participants are trying to justify how as much the public was manipulated by the leftist propaganda, lies and cohersion the folks rejected them.  Trump won.  Hillary lost.  It seems the more education you have the dumber you are for whites.  Non whites are just dumb to begin with.  These people need to get real jobs that contribute to the GNP.

  4. so um so ummmm right ummmm right ummmm uneducated voters ummmm right so u mmmmmmmmmmm elected Trump u mmmmmmmmmmm right? so ummmm right? ummmmmm so right?

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